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1. Introduction. 
The barcode is the world’s most familiar business standard. We use regularly it as 
consumers scanning items at supermarket checkouts. But the barcode is far more than this. 
Since its first commercial point of scale application in the early 1970s, the barcode and 
related standards have become indispensible tools for the management of global supply 
chains, providing previously unimagined transparency about the location and progress of 
goods and materials; play an essential role in the safe and effective delivery of 
pharmaceuticals, blood and other health care services and are finding applications in a very 
wide range of other businesses. Can similar standardization achieve a parallel 
transformation of financial services? Could such developments provide effective tools for 
monitoring and mitigating systemic financial risk? 
To address this question Sections 2 and 3 of this paper describe the development of the 
barcode and related standards and their subsequent internationalization. Section 4 then 
reviews some of the efforts at similar standardization in financial services, looking at the FIX 
protocol, at SWIFT messaging standards and at the current proposed new regulatory 
standard for legal entity identification, the Global LEI. Finally the concluding Section 5, 
following the lead offered by the recent speech of Andrew Haldane, executive director for 
financial stability at the Bank of England, assesses the lessons from the barcode for financial 
services and in particular the question of whether a similar standardization can assist 
current efforts to monitor and mitigate systemic financial risk.3  
While agreeing with Haldane on the huge potential business benefits from a similar 
standardization in financial services as that which has already taken place in the retail and 
supply chain industries, and the potential this offers for more effective monitoring of 
systemic financial risk, the more detailed review of the history of the barcode provided here 
suggests a degree of caution. There are considerable barriers to adoption of global 
standards in financial services. The parallel with the barcode is not exact. A regulatory 
driven approach to imposing global standards – without the full engagement of 
shareholders and without addressing the substantial and challenging change of changing 
culture within the financial services firms to focus less on short term profits on more on long 
term benefits to customers and shareholders – is unlikely to reap all of the available benefits. 
2. Origins of the barcode and its initial US adoption 
A standout event in the history of the bar code took place at 8.01am on June 26, 1974 at a 
Marsh’s supermarket in Troy, Ohio. This was when, Sharon Buchan, 31 year old check out 
assistant, scanned a 10 pack of 50 sticks of Wrigley’s juicy fruit gum using a laser scanner 
and sold it for 67 cents, the first time an item was scanned and then sold at point of sale.  
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Figure 1: An EAN barcoding 
 
An example of a 13-digit EAN number coding (a standard international article number, originally European 
Article Number). It inherits the ‘two block’ structure of the original UPC-A encoding of the 12-digit UPC 
number, but uses Laurer’s parity system to encode an additional character by varying the parity of the left 
half of the symbol, thus enabling it to encode all thirteen digits (printed below the barcode) plus a final 
additional check-sum digit.  
The first two sections of this paper take the story of the barcode, both backward in time before the first commercial barcode scanning 1974 and forward to today. It should first be pointed out that barcodes (such as the one illustrated in Figure 1) are data carriers, standards for the electronic capture of information on physical items using laser scanning, but the business application of the bar-code depended on the parallel development of identification standards, for identifying products and subsequently (for use in the supply chain) shipments, locations and entities; and for their more recent supply chain application on the development of communication standards for the exchange of information between computer systems (notably the XML language but also specific standards tailored for use in the supply chain). The following account outlines the joint evolution of data capture, identification and communication standards in the history of the barcode. 
While technical proposals and patents for automated checkout processing go back to the 1930s, the technology eventually used for this first scanning has its roots a quarter century before the transaction in Troy, in the late 1940s. Then two graduate students – Bernard  Silver and Joseph Woodland – at the Drexel Institute of Technology in Philadelphia took up a challenge posed by the chief executive of a local retailing chain to develop a system to automatically read product information during checkout. They experimented with different approaches, but eventually settled on a system of pattern recognition, with thick and thin lines, analogous to the dots and dashes of Morse code. In 1952 they patented the first bar code system, for both linear and ‘bulls-eye’ (circular) barcodes.4-5 
Barcoding did not however find any immediate commercial application. One barrier to widespread use was that the bar-coding needed to be accompanied by a system of numerical product identification i.e. a further accompanying standard. This emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s when an initiative of the National Association of Food Chains NAFC in the US led to the development of the ‘Universal Grocery Produce Identifier’, which later became the widely used 11 digit Universal Product Code UPC. This code consists of an initial category digit (for general grocery applications this is 0), a 5 digit code representing the manufacturer and a further 5 digit code representing the product. 
4  
Advances in computing and scanning technologies was making the possibility of automated checkout and subsequent storage of information an attractive commercial possibility. But a reliable process for printing and then reading these codes was needed. For two years between 1971 and 1973 committees from the US grocery industry, with advisory support from McKinsey, established (demanding) product specifications and considered the choice of the appropriate symbol for automated scanning. The leading proposal, amongst more than a dozen commissioned, was that of RCA who used a version of the Silver-Woodland ‘bulls-eye’ bar code (RCA had actually purchased the patent before its expiry in 1969). This technology though was technically flawed, the most notable problem that ‘running of ink’ in the printing process could make the bar code indecipherable.6  
Eventually, in March 1973 the UPC symbol selection committee adopted a rival technology that more effectively supported reliable point of sale scanning. This was the now ubiquitous linear ‘UPC-A’ barcode system developed by a team at IBM – led by Laurer with Woodland as a member – which encoded the 11 digit UPC code using the now familiar linear barcode used at point of sale worldwide, with an additional twelfth check digit and ‘guard Bars’ at the beginning, middle and end of the code to facilitate scanning.  
The success of the UPC-A barcode over its rivals was due to a number of technical features (these are described in Appendix D of the reminiscences of the IBM engineer responsible for several of these technical innovations).7 Printing in the direction of the lines avoided the decipherability problems that undermined the RCA technology. ‘Omni directional reading’ of the IBM linear barcode– a requirement of the symbol selection committee that the bar code should be readable from any angle – was achieved by using two right-angled mirror at point of sale, ensuring that a scanner would always be able translate the bar code regardless of the orientation with which it was presented.8  
An elegant economy in the footprint of the bar code (which was required to be no more than 1½ square inches) was achieved by coding the full 12 digit number (including the check digit) as two independently read 6-digit numbers each of which was printed as small (non-square) block, separated by a quiet space. In today’s world of low cost high performance computing such technical details matter less, but in the mid-1970s they were crucial to achieving an effective solution. 
Despite an effective technology coming onto the market in the mid-1970s, the take-up of bar coding at point of sale was at first relatively slow.  Manufacturers had to be persuaded to place the new coding on their products. The original laser scanning systems were expensive.9 The purchaser of the ten pack of Wrigley’s chewing gum in 1974 was Clyde Dawson, the research and development manager at Marsh’s supermarkets. Without the enthusiasm of individuals like Dawson and of supermarket owner Robert Marsh for technological experiment, regardless of immediate commercial payoff, initial efforts at developing point of sale scanning might never have taken place when they did. 
But the potential for commercial payoff was critical for adoption. Eventual takeoff was driven by the finding that the benefits were actually much larger than originally anticipated. An unfavourable balance of cost against perceived benefits meant that by 1977 only around 200 stores in the US had point of sale scanning facilities. But research by IBM with these early adopting clients, published as their Automation Benefits Study, revealed surprisingly large commercial returns on investment, with an estimated return on equity of 51% (a audio interview with Bill Selmeier author of this research gives many examples of the benefits; his 
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book tells this story in more detail).10-11 Much of these benefits came from the communication of detailed sales information to management, allowing them for example to discover the impact of small price changes on sales volumes.12 Realisation of the large benefits from point scale scanning led to rapid adoption; by 1980 some 8,000 stores a year in the US were adopting UPC-A scanning. 
3. Internationalisation and the transformation of the supply chain 
The next stage of bar code adoption was internationalization. There was strong and growing 
interest from other countries in the initial US efforts to develop automated bar code 
scanning. By 1976 this had led to the proposal of an extended numbering system, the 
‘International Article Number’ or EAN (originally developed as a European Article Number, 
hence the acronym, but adopted worldwide), which extended the US UPC number by adding 
a further initial digit. Combined with the initial category number, and sometimes with the 
first character of the 5 digit manufacturing code, EAN could be used to identify the country 
of origin. Work on EAN encouraged international co-ordination of identification standards, 
with the creation of the Universal Code Council in the US and of EAN international (a 
representative body for various national product identification bodies.) 
Laurer at IBM, through clever use of redundancy in the UPC-A symbol, was able to adjust 
the algorithms for converting UPC-A symbol into a human readable decimal number so that 
the 13 digit EANs could be encoded and read without any alteration of the UPC-A standard 
or any need to update installed UPC scanners.13 
Two further significant developments extended the reach of EAN in 1980. The first – of great 
significance to the academic community – was the allocation of the initial location codes 
978 and 979 to an imaginary nation Bookland, serving as the country of origin for all 
published books; thus was the familiar ISBN number born with an immediately scannable 
bar code representation. The second, critical for subsequent application, was agreement in 
1988 by the Universal Code Council/EAN on a new standard EAN-code 128 for the tracking 
of goods and consignments in the supply chain. This code has a similar linear representation 
as UPC-A and EAN, but could support 48 alpha-numerical elements, instead of 12 (or 14) 
numerical digits. EAN-code 128 was not useable for rapid scanning at point of sale, since it 
did not support omni-directional reading or offer the same small footprint as UPC-A and 
EAN. Its impact was opening up a whole new chapter of bar code applications in monitoring 
of the supply chain both domestically and internationally. 
This standardization, together with the adoption of that humble but crucial component of 
the global supply chain the shipping container, underpins modern international trade.14 In 
the subsequent 30 years companies have come to rely on electronic recording and 
communication to provide extraordinary visibility of their global supply chains. 
Consignments can now be tracked by location and interventions – initial orders, response to 
delays, financing and payments – can carried out promptly and appropriately. The 
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consequence has been a transformative, reducing costs and delays and radically improving 
quality standards.  
For all this to happen a number of different developments had to come together. Some of 
these required a hitherto unknown degree of co-ordination amongst the many national 
bodies that, as a result of the spread of the point of sale barcode, had taken responsibility 
for business identification standards (GS1 provide a fuller overview).15 These international 
standards include: 
 Identification numbering standards. These include: 
i) the Global Shipping Container Code (SSCC) first introduced in the 1980s, 
which is used to identify uniquely and cartons, pallets and packages as well as 
containers;  
ii) the family of Global Trade Item Numbers (GTIN), of which EAN/UPC is one, 
allowing unique identification of all products and services through the supply 
chain and at point of sale.  
iii) the Global location number (GLN) which identifies both locations (which can 
be as specific as a shelf in a warehouse), legal entities (for example the 
division of a company) or a function such as an accounting department. 
 Data carriers suitable for electronic reading, of which the UPC-A and EAN Code 128 
have been the most important; but there are other carriers including RFID (radio 
frequency identification tags) which is especially useful in supply chain applications 
because it can be used to read a number of items of a single pallet and increasingly 
widely used data matrix (2-dimensional) barcodes suitable for use both at point of 
sale, in the supply chain and also for interpretation by mobile phones. These carry 
far more information than the traditional linear bar codes. 
 Communication standards exploiting the spread of internet communication and the 
use of XML mark up to support seamless communication of supply chain information 
within and between organizations. 
Many of these standards are now supported globally by GS1, a federation of national 
business standards bodies (see http://www.gs1.org/ ), formed by the 2005 merger of 
Universal Code Council and EAN authority, and co-ordinated by a Brussels based global 
office, which prepares voluntary global standards, including the barcode, that have been 
adopted in a number of industries, notably retailing, healthcare and transport and logistics.   
Figure 2: Branding of the GS1 supported standards 
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The four key groups of standards supported by GS1 each have their own visual branding 
(see Fig 2). In addition to barcodes, GS1 supports the EPC global standards into microchip 
recognition, the GDSN global identity standards, and eCom standards for business to 
business communication 
Global industry standards such as those supported by GS1 have not been as fully adopted in 
all industries, in the same way as they have been in retail, supply chain and healthcare. In 
other industries, e.g. automobile or aircraft manufacturing, it is more common to find that 
major companies have developed proprietary systems of standards for their own products 
and components. This is not to say that standards are not crucially important, for example 
the sophisticated fault reporting and maintenance systems that keep modern airliners in 
skies depend crucially on identification standards for aircraft components, but there is no 
obvious business reason for say Boeing and Airbus to share common standards. Another 
example of a widely used proprietary standard is in armed forces supply, with the Pentagon 
– the US defense administration – imposing its own system of standards on all suppliers to 
the US armed forces. These examples indicated that agreement on and adoption of global or 
industry wide standards is not always easily achieved. 
A central feature of GS1 is that is a federation of operationally separate national GS1 
organisations. Many of these national GS1 bodies, while now adopting a common name 
emphasizing their participation in global standard setting, originated independently in 
response to the need for support of local retail bar-code standards. Much of the work of 
these national GS1 bodies is now around overseeing training and education of local users in 
the application of GS1 standards. Where there is demand from a local industry they may 
also establish their own local business standards (provided these do not conflict with the 
global GS1 standards). A good example comes from the German automotive industry, where 
the different companies have agreed local GS1 standards for spare parts (source personal 
communication). The resulting quality improvement and cost reductions provides German 
manufactures with a competitive edge over their non-domestic rivals. 
Standardisation was only one aspect of dramatic change in supply chain management over 
the past thirty years. A entire business discipline ‘supply chain management’ has also 
emerged. In 1996 a global body – the Supply Chain Council -- devoted to improving 
professional standards in supply chain management was created, and now has over 1,000 
corporate members. There is also now an entire industry supplying global logistic services. 
Supply chain management has become staple fare on MBA and other business degrees with 
a number of standard textbooks.16 
One aspect of supply chain management, of relevance to financial stability, is the control of 
the so-called ‘bull whip’ effect, a situation in which initial order fluctuations from the final 
consumers, are amplified down the supply chain.17 Information technology has played a key 
role in controlling the bullwhip effect, with the insight that stability is supported by close 
monitoring and accurate transmission of current consumer demand, instead of relying on 
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mechanical forecasts that can extrapolate disturbances. Thus electronic communication and 
the standards that support them are crucial for promoting supply chain stability. 
Another major application of bar code scanning has been in health services. At an early 
stage it was recognized that bar codes and bar code scanning could provide invaluable 
control over the use of pharmaceuticals and other health care products, ensuring the 
correct product is used and correct dosage applied. This is another example of a slow 
beginning followed by eventual take-off, this time however driven by regulators. Despite the 
introduction of bar code systems for health care, initial take up was slow. Only after 
February 2004, when the US Food and Drug Authority introduced a requirement that all 
medications must have bar codes (and in 2005 on accredited blood products), did adoption 
take off.  
4. Experience in financial services 
Having recounted the history of bar-coding and its spread into the supply chain and other 
industries, this section discusses the related experience of standardization in financial 
services. Three examples from financial services are reviewed here: the FIX protocol, SWIFT 
messaging standards and the current effort to establish a global system of legal entity 
identifiers (or LEI) for use in wholesale financial markets.  
The FIX protocol is an open messaging standard, maintained by the not-for-profit body FIX 
Protocol Ltd, and used for trading level and some post-trade communications among 
brokers, investment managers and trading platforms. There is no charge for the use of FIX, 
although a large number of vendors sell trading and asset management software that is 
based on FIX.   
FIX was first developed and piloted in 1992-1993 as a joint initiative between the US broker-
dealer Salmon Brothers and one of their major clients Fidelity investments, as a means of 
standardizing the flow of messaging for equity market orders and trade execution.18 The FIX 
initiative quickly attracted interest from a range of participants, first in New York equity 
markets and  little more than a year later in London, both from buy side institutions such as 
Fidelity and from sell side broker dealers. By January 1997 the highly successful FIX protocol 
version 4.0 was launched.19 This and successive versions of FIX are now the well established 
standard formats for pre-trade messaging in equity markets around the world. 
A consultancy study by OXERA reviews the benefits of FIX and the challenges to its wider 
adoption.20 Direct benefits flow to FIX users from lower connectivity costs (a single interface 
can be used to connect with many different brokers or clients) and from reduced costs and 
operational risks. Even  more important however may be the indirect benefits that arise 
when a large proportion of firms in a market have adopted the protocol, allowing 
connectivity to be maintained with a larger numbers of brokers or clients, leading in turn to 
more choice and increased competition. Increased competition in turn puts pressure on 
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brokers to deliver better quality services, e.g.  improved execution strategies or access to 
new trading technologies. Finally potential further efficiency gains may be realized when a 
large proportion of firms adopt messaging standards, including standardized reporting of 
trading activities and exposures, reduced costs of complying with regulatory requirements 
and more efficient execution of post-trade processes.  
Interviews reported by Oxera confirm that FIX has played a crucial role in supporting 
competition between traditional exchanges and new trading platforms, both in the US and 
in Europe, and in supporting the growth of automated ‘algorithmic’ trading. This has in turn 
– through contraction of fees and bid-ask spreads in equity markets – resulted in substantial 
reduction  in transaction costs for end-investors. However Oxera also point out the 
challenges to further adoption of standardized messaging in global financial markets. 
Outside of global equity markets because many of the direct private benefits of automated 
message flow have already been achieved, albeit with relatively fragmented systems and 
approaches that differ from one firm or one market to another. There is therefore relatively 
little private incentive to adopt FIX more fully across the full range of wholesale financial 
market activities. The indirect benefits of greater use of FIX in foreign exchange, fixed 
income and derivative markets and in post-trade, while very substantial, are public not 
private and so provide relatively little adoption incentive for individual firms.21 
Similar lessons emerge from the history of SWIFT. This is recounted by Scott and Zachariadis 
who describe SWIFT’s activities as follows ‘SWIFT is responsible for providing the platform, 
products and services that allow member institutions to connect and exchange financial 
information.’22 SWIFT, then called the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial 
Telecommunications, was established in 1973 as a collective owned by 239 banks from 
fifteen countries, established in order to address the inefficiencies of sending international 
payment instructions via Telex (Telex is short for teleprinter exchange, the now archaic but 
one widely used 1950s technology for transmission of printed message via telephone lines, 
much as telephones are used for audio communication.) As reported by Scott and 
Zachariadis these Telex payment instructions were sent in free text format, and as many as 
ten separate messages might be required in order to deal with ambiguities and complete a 
single payment instruction. SWIFT commenced operationally in 1977, with the introduction 
of the SWIFT network, providing an much more efficient communications platform that 
could send instructions ‘within a minute of being entered’. The key benefit however was the 
‘automation of the standardized authentication and data entry processes’ that were 
responsible for many of the delays in telexed payment instructions. 
As Scott and Zachariadis document the standardization introduced by SWIFT emphasized 
backwards compatibility with the older Telex based payment instructions, simply because 
during these early years many banks were not on the SWIFT network. The benefits of 
standardization therefore depended on being able to choose, between sending the same 
standardized message either by Telex or through the SWIFT network. Thus SWIFT simply 
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adopted identification codes (SWIFT codes) that were based on the Bank Identifier Codes 
already used for Telex payment instructions.  
During the 1980s SWIFT introduced several technical developments: providing standard 
connections to the SWIFT network known as ‘SWIFT interface devices’ or SIDs; introducing a 
network with distributed processing capability (SWIFT II) that could cope with much greater 
volume of traffic; and most interestingly SWIFT messaging standards were adapted for use 
in other applications, for example internal communication within major banks and most 
importantly for messaging in the securities industry under the International Standards 
Organization standard ISO7775. In the early 2000’s this was replaced by the more flexible 
ISO15022. SWIFT was given management responsibility for maintaining these standards. 
SWIFT has grown enormously over the years. Scott and Zachariadis Table 2 report that the 
number of members rose from 238 in 1973 to 8468 in 2008 (despite the very substantially 
increased concentration of the banking industry over these years through mergers and 
acquisitions), while the number of messages per annum increased from 3.4 million in 1977 
to 3.5 billion in 2007. This has led to increasing governance challenges, as summarized by 
Scott and Zachariadis: ‘What started as a focused project to solve a relatively bounded set of 
immediate problems subsequently grew into a community of practice and eventually began 
to be regarded as a cartel with control over the possibility for innovation in networks and 
standards in the sector.’ For example SWIFT has been accused by corporate treasurers of 
serving the interests of its member banks and obstructing developments in standards that 
might better serve the needs of corporate customers, for example through creating the 
possibility of greater competition in the provision of cash management services through 
direct non-bank access to the SWIFT network. 
The most recent effort at establishing standards in financial services has been a regulatory 
initiative, the global ‘legal entity identifier’ or LEI annnounced by the Financial Stability 
Board.23 This is intended to provide a unique numerical identifier for every participant in 
wholesale financial markets. In the vision of Andrew Haldane, together with the further 
establishment of a standardized global systems of instrument or product identifiers (PI), LEI 
is intended to provide the basic ingredients – the nouns and adjectives – for a common 
financial language that in turn can be used to provide complete transparency of financial 
transactions and exposures, similar to that achieved in the global supply chain.3 The 
institutional and legal arrangements for LEI are due to be put in place by the second quarter 
of 2013, and an interim LEI system is already being developed in New York markets (by the 
US securities depository and clearing body DTCC together with SWIFT) for the registration 
and clearing of over the counter derivative positions, as required by the Dodd-Frank act.  
A distinguishing feature of LEI, making it very different from the barcode or the successful 
establishment of FIX protocol and SWIFT, is that the impulse for establishing this new 
standard has come not from the industry in response to a perceived business need; but 
rather from the recognition by regulators that the problems of the recent global financial 
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crisis were made worse by fragmented information systems and the inability of firms to 
aggregate positions (most obviously in the case of the failure of Lehman Brothers 
International because few market participants had any accurate measure of their exposure 
to the bankruptcy, let alone of the exposure of other market participants). Potentially the 
LEI could yield substantial reductions in both operational costs and risk in many aspects of 
wholesale market trading, but this is not certain. Whether it does so depends critically on its 
successful adoption as a universal standard, which as the history of the barcode indicates 
may not take happen until a persuasive business case emerges. 
5. Conclusion: lessons for financial services 
The first and encouraging lesson for financial services from the rise and success of the barcode (and 
associated identification and communication standards) is that it illustrates the great potential for 
cost and risk reduction in business to business (B2B) processes, when common industry standards 
are established.  
Some of the greatest potential for cost and risk reduction comes from reduced costs of the 
processing and exchange of information. This is especially obvious in wholesale markets and 
international payments. The FIX protocol has allowed substantial cost reductions in pre-trade 
communication in equity markets, avoiding the necessity for buy side firms to maintain a set of 
multiple bespoke interfaces to route orders to their brokers. In international financial transactions 
the dramatic rise in the volume of SWIFT messages, and corresponding ease of transmitting secure 
instructions for payments and security instruments, testifies to the substantial efficiency gains built 
on SWIFT messaging standards. 
While these have been substantial gains, the full potential for cost-efficiency gains in financial 
services from standardization of data remains far from fully exploited. To mention two examples, 
post-trade processing (clearing and settlement) continues to be plagued by trade failures where 
discrepancies in the information held by the two sides of the trade mean that the trade cannot be 
completed. For example one common cause of trade failure is inaccurate information on the identity 
of the ultimate customers (this often happens when several trades are packaged together as a single 
transaction) in turn requiring a time consuming manual intervention to reconcile the information 
held by buyer and seller and allow final settlement. Standardisation of data, such as the LEI, 
promises to eliminate most such trade failures and lead to genuine ‘straight through’ processing of 
investment transactions. Information problems also interfere with the settlement of derivative 
contracts, especially if obligations move from one entity to another either through sale or transfer. 
The potential for cost and risk reduction goes much further than this, through the possibility of a 
‘quantum leap’ in the transparency of financial firms. The speech by Bank of England Executive 
Director Andrew Haldane  has rightly emphasized these benefits, addressing the considerable 
shortcomings in the information available to both regulators and investors.3 
One example of many from the global financial crisis has been the great difficulty banks have faced 
in working out their own exposures to various types of problem loans. When asked by regulators 
‘What is your holding of securities of type X or your lending to group of customers Y? How are these 
sub-portfolios performing?’ the usual response was that no immediate answer could be given. 
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Answering such questions required a time consuming and expensive information retrieval exercise, 
with a lot of manual intervention or special coding. 
The following exchange, from Oral Evidence given to a committee of the UK Houses of Parliament, 
gets to the heart of the matter:24 
‘Chairman (Peter Lilley) : On the question of information, should the power to obtain data be 
modelled on the US Office of Financial Research? As a related question, you once said, 
Governor, that you did not want to impose onerous obligations on banks to provide endless 
information every day but you want them to be in a position to have the data so that when you 
phone up to ask, “How much Greek debt do you have?” they can answer without having to 
spend three weeks looking for it. Do you need any powers to ensure that banks have the 
information?  
Sir Mervyn King: The PRA can do that; they have the powers. It is important to go down a route 
where we do not say to the banks, “You must send us this data every three months”, and 
nothing is ever taken off the list. During the crisis, and even quite recently, when we wanted 
information it turned out that the regulators did not have data relevant to the problem at hand. 
It is a different approach to data collection. It is trying to get away from the provision of a lot of 
routine information, management reports and detail, which has no relevance to the PRA and 
no one would ever look at, and focusing on the stuff that we ought to look at. Rather than 
burdening the banks with a massive data reporting requirement, we should make it clear to 
them, “We think you ought to know the answers to the following questions, and from time to 
time we will want to know the data, too, but do not send it to us until we ask for it.” One of the 
changes in the culture of the supervisors that we are trying to bring about is to get them to 
think about the data they require to do their job, not take from their drawer a long list of 
questions they have been given and tick or not tick the boxes but sit down and say, “What do I 
need to know about this bank to judge whether or not it is too risky?” It will take a long time to 
change that culture, but those are the kinds of people we are committed to growing, 
developing and turning into effective supervisors.  
Andrew Bailey: From time to time we do it now. I do it in running supervision. We say, “We 
want this by close of business tomorrow.” Sometimes I get protests from chief executives of 
banks and I say to them, “Look, I’m not asking you for anything you should not have yourself to 
run your business.’  
Thus the situation during the crisis, and this is still largely true today, is that senior management of 
firms were typically unable to retrieve timely and accurate information on their own exposures.  
The situation is even worse when it comes to the data required for monitoring and dealing with 
systemic financial risk. Every firm in wholesale and retail financial markets, use their own proprietary 
standards, so that even when firms are able to provide information to regulators on their exposures, 
regulators are not in a position to aggregate this information in any meaningful way. An 
acknowledged major shortcoming of financial regulation prior to the global financial crisis was that it 
ignored risks to the financial system as a whole, in particular the potential for systemic impact from 
the failure of firms such as AIG or the monoline insurers providing protection in the credit default 
swap market; or the wide range of institutions engaged in ‘shadow banking’ i.e. maturity mismatch 
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outside of the regulated banking sector pursued with very limited capital. When Lehman Brothers 
failed it turned out that neither regulators nor individual firms had any clear idea of what exposure 
they had to Lehman or to other large systemically important firms. Little has fundamentally changed. 
Today, even though regulators are now alert to the potential build-up of systemic risk, they still do 
not have to tools for measuring and monitoring such systemic risks.  
Underlying all these informational retrieval difficulties has been a combination of old systems and 
fragmented standards. Many bank processes rely on old legacy information systems in operation for 
twenty five years or more, with only limited operational flexibility (they were designed to do a few 
things, such as credit or debit accounts, accurately; and have only limited further functionality).  This 
problem is exacerbated by a plethora of different data standards within larger institutions, an 
inheritance of decades of growth through acquisition. In any particular market area larger banks can 
have ten or twenty or even more legacy systems, doing essentially the same tasks, that do not 
communicate well with each other. Such messy arrangements were not planned, they are simply the 
byproduct of mergers and acquisitions and the development of incompatible solutions in different 
regions and jurisdictions.25 
Uniform industry wide standards could address these inefficiencies. They could also yield further 
benefits, for example allowing outside stakeholders, both regulators and investors, to compare the 
positions of different institutions and summarize these positions at institutional and industry level. 
The ability to trade risky securities, including securitized assets, would also be greatly enhanced by 
common industry standards that allow purchasers to be fully informed about what is being sold. 
There are thus a wide range of evident benefits to having uniform industry standards across financial 
services, similar to the barcode and other GS1 standards in retail, supply chain and healthcare. 
The second, and more sobering lesson for financial services, is the great challenge to achieving 
widespread adoption of standards, at either firm or industry level. It is far from being enough just to 
create a standard, it has to be used, and for this to happen firms need incentives for adoption. 
Uptake can be slow, even in the case of the barcode this took several years, and may never happen 
at all, especially if adoption does not suit the private interests of individual firms.  
The experience of financial services indicates that, while standards have been adopted at global level 
by most participants in some particular markets and types of transaction, the adoption of standards 
many other aspects of financial services has been limited. FIX, while extended to provide 
functionality in other markets and in the post-trade environment has not become the dominant tool 
for communication that it is in equity market order and execution. SWIFT is essential in some 
contexts, in particular international payments and securities transaction messaging, but is by no 
means a universal standard. The uptake and application of LEI remains untested and unclear. 
A further reason for weak adoption incentives are the costs of replacing old legacy systems. The cost 
of change is not just purchasing new hardware and software, it is the herculean task of converting all 
existing loan and investment records to the new standards (this can explain why most successful 
examples of standards adoption in financial services – FIX and SWIFT messaging – have all been 
about addressing critical inefficiencies in potentially profitable transaction processing, not 
addressing lack of functionality in the recording and management of exposures).  
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All this suggests that the rise and success of the barcode in retail point of sale and supply chain 
management was due to a combination of circumstances that cannot be easily replicated in financial 
services. The barcode and related standards, having eventually achieved widespread use in point of 
sale application, provided a relatively direct means for achieving cost and risk reduction in domestic 
and global supply chains. Individual firms had a strong interest in imposing uptake of standards on 
their suppliers, to lower costs and improve reliability of delivery and quality of supply.  
The availability and further development of the new global numbering, data carrying and 
communication standards (now managed under the auspices of GS1) reinforced and intensified the 
trend towards standardization and transparency of the supply chain. Suppliers who did not adopt 
these standards could not compete with those that did. Purchasers that did not fully exploit supply 
chain inefficiencies were at a market competitive disadvantage. Incentives were strongly aligned 
towards adoption of standards and continuous improvement of supply chain standards. 
This makes clear that the analogy between the barcode in retail and supply chain and the various 
communication, identification and product standards in financial services is not an exact one. For 
individual firms in many, although not all, financial markets and financial transactions, the cost and 
efficiency benefits of standardization are not nearly large enough to outweigh the potential threat to 
revenues from increased competition. The virtuous circle found in the supply chain -- of 
development and adoption of standards in the supply encouraging more development and adoption 
– is not present in most areas of financial services.  
While the examples of FIX and SWIFT illustrate that the benefits in terms of cost and risk reduction 
can justify widespread adoption, this is not always the case. In many markets, for example foreign 
exchange or government bonds or OTC derivatives, that are dominated by a handful of dealers, 
increased competition is a vital threat that could threaten profits margins in sales and trading. The 
incentives on individual firms to engage in process standardization and transformation are therefore 
much weaker. This in turn suggests that the achievement of the large potential gains of 
standardization identified by Haldane are going to require a much more conscious industry wide 
effort than  has been necessary for the rise and success of the barcode in retail, supply chain and 
health care.  
Two further lessons may be mentioned. The relative weakness of these private incentives can 
explain why the LEI, an essential component of global standardization in financial services, has been 
a regulatory rather than an industry initiative. But a purely regulatory driven process is in danger of 
eventually foundering if it cannot overcome the challenge of weak private incentives for adopting 
common data standards by individual firms.  Data quality and data management remains a low 
priority for management and shareholders. The ‘Chief Data Officer’ or equivalent position is of far 
lesser seniority than the Chief Financial Officer or even the Chief Risk Officer. No annual report of 
any financial firm pays any attention to issues of data quality or data management. Yet the quality 
and relevance of the risk and accounting information that is highlighted in these reports depends, 
ultimately, on the availability of adequate data – the problem of ‘garbage-in garbage-out’ is hardly 
addressed . Moreover the lengthy statements in every annual report about how firms value their 
customers and place customer service at the heart of their operations are meaningless without 
ensuring the quality of data that actually allows firms to do this in any practical way. 
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Issue of data management and data quality matter for all firms, but especially so in financial services, 
because the healthy functioning of the rest of the economy depends on financial intermediaries and 
financial markets transferring resources from savers to finance productive investment at relatively 
low additional cost for their services; and providing the insurance and risk management to 
customers at reasonable but not excessive charges. These services are essential to enable non-
financial companies and other borrowers to pursue all available positive net present value 
investment opportunities.  
In practice financial services firms like many publicly traded companies are not focused on serving 
customers, but instead on achieving short term profits, by imposing high fees and a high interest 
rate margins and keeping costs as low as possible. This means that they hold back from the 
investments that can allow them to better identify investment opportunities and or more accurately 
quantify risks and they resist, as far as possible, any standardization that will reduce barriers to entry 
from new competitors.  This approach will not deliver the economic growth that investors demand 
and our economies need. In the longer run it undermines the financial returns to financial services 
firms themselves. Shareholders thus need to be persuaded that it is in their best interests that 
management of financial firms embrace the opportunities offered by standardization of data and 
focus on the long term benefits that this can achieve. 
For this reason the full exploitation of the benefits of LEI and subsequent PI (product identification 
standards) will require an intensive engagement with shareholders in financial services firms, 
encouraging them to take the wider view and pressing for changes in the companies they own, and 
in particular prioritizing the necessary investments in data standards and data information, 
necessary for delivering improved services to corporate, retail and institutional investor customers.  
Finally, a comment on the business culture of financial services, it is striking how much of the initial 
development of the barcode depended not on financial reward, but simply on a spirit of adventure 
and a commitment to finding better ways of getting things done. Yes, financial incentives matter, but 
the story of the rise and success of the barcode provides a clear rebuttal of the widespread 
perception in the financial services industry that the contribution of employees to business success 
is solely motivated by and can only be achieved by offering wildly generous financial rewards.  On 
the contrary, as the personal biographies of the early barcode pioneers testify, truly valuable 
technological and business innovation, such as the developments that underpinned the 
transformation of the global supply chain are typically the work of relatively modestly paid 
individuals motivated primarily by the fascination and satisfaction of their work. It is difficult to deny 
that financial services would be much improved industry – for customers, investors and employees 
alike – if such attitudes were more widespread. 
 
Notes 
1.  I am grateful to comments from two anonymous referees and from audiences at the 
2012 SIBOS conference in Osaka, the Bank of England Centre for Central Banking Studies 
January 2013 conference on regulatory data, and also to George Laurer for correcting some 
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